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ABSTRACT. Endowing computers with the ability to apply commonsense knowledge with human-
level performance is a primary challenge for computer science, comparable in importance to past
great challenges in other fields of science such as the sequencing of the human genome. The right
approach to this problem is still under debate. Here we shall discuss and attempt to justify one ap-
proach, that of knowledge infusion. This approach is based on the view that the fundamental objective
that needs to be achieved is robustness in the following sense: a framework is needed in which a
computer system can represent pieces of knowledge about the world, each piece having some un-
certainty, and the interactions among the pieces having even more uncertainty, such that the system
can nevertheless reason from these pieces so that the uncertainties in its conclusions are at least
controlled. In knowledge infusion rules are learned from the world in a principled way so that sub-
sequent reasoning using these rules will also be principled, and subject only to errors that can be
bounded in terms of the inverse of the effort invested in the learning process.
1 Introduction
One of the most important challenges for computer science is that of understanding how
systems that acquire and manipulate commonsense knowledge can be created. By common-
sense knowledge we mean knowledge of the kind that humans can successfully manipulate
but for which no systematic theory is known. For example, conducting appropriate ev-
eryday conversations among humans requires such commonsense knowledge, while the
prediction of the trajectory of a projectile can be accomplished using the systematic theory
offered by physics.
We argue that to face this challenge one first needs a framework in which inductive
learning and logical reasoning can be both expressed and their different natures reconciled.
The learning provides the necessary robustness to the uncertainties of the world. It enables a
system to go to the world for as much data as needed to resolve uncertainties. The reasoning
is needed to provide a principled basis for manipulating and reaching conclusions from the
uncertain knowledge that has been learned. The process by which we can infuse a system
with commonsense knowledge, in a form suitable for such reasoning, we call knowledge
infusion or KI [13, 15].
Robust logic [14] is a concrete proposal for realizing KI. It offers a formalism for learn-
ing rules that are suitable for later chaining together for the purpose of reasoning. In this
system both learning and reasoning can be performed in polynomial time, and, further, the
reasoning has certain soundness and completeness properties, and the errors in learning
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and reasoning can be upper bounded in terms of the inverse of a polynomial function of the
effort expended in the learning.
For brevity we shall refer to a system that can successfully reason with commonsense
knowledge as an intelligent system. Recent headlines in the New York Times - with one word
omitted in each case - included “Can Weeds Help Solve the ..... Crisis?” and “Oil Hits New
High as Dow Flirts With ..... Territory.” It would be reasonable to expect intelligent systems
to be able to make reasonable guesses of the missing words. To achieve such capabilities
there is a need both for access to commonsense knowledge, as well as for an ability to apply
such knowledge to situations not previously experienced.
We suggest that for such a word completion, or any other, task to be a valid test for
intelligent systems, it will need to have two properties in common with the Turing Test [11].
First, there should be no a priori restrictions, to any limited subdomain or microworld, on
the domain of knowledge treated. Second, there needs to be some numerical evaluation of
performance relative to some baseline. We regard these two properties as the most funda-
mental prerequisites for tests of progress in this area.
Recently we have reported on the results of experiments that test whether KI is ef-
fective for such an unrestricted word completion task [8]. These experiments, performed
on a data set of a half a million natural language sentences, showed that this task of pre-
dicting a deleted word from a sentence could be performed to a higher accuracy by this
method than by a baseline learning method that did not use reasoning. In this experiment
the learned rules contained commonsense knowledge about the world, while the baseline
method could be regarded as a more syntactic learning method, in the sense of n-gram
methods in natural language processing but using more powerful Winnow based learning
methods as developed by Roth and his coworkers [4]. The experiments highlight the tech-
nical challenges of learning from noisy data reliably enough that the learned rules could be
chained together fruitfully. In particular there is a need for algorithms that have good run
times and good generalization properties, and for methods of chaining rules that preserve
the generalization guarantees.
Technical descriptions of the approach described can be found in references [8, 14, 15]
and we shall not detail any of that here. In this note we shall attempt to summarize infor-
mally the general justification of our approach in comparison with some alternatives. Since
the effort needed to endow computer systems with usable commonsense knowledge can
be expected to be very considerable, it seems worthwhile to invest effort into evaluating
carefully the various available approaches.
2 Achieving Robustness
As soon as the feasibility of large scale computations became evident in the middle of the
twentieth century an immediate concern was whether the execution of millions of instruc-
tions, each one highly accurate in itself, would inevitably lead to errors accumulating and
giving totally incorrect final answers. For processing commonsense knowledge this robust-
ness problem would appear to be an especially important concern, since significant uncer-
tainties may appear here even in individual steps. This paper is predicated on the proposi-
tion that any theory of commonsense reasoning that fails to include robustness in its subject
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matter will also fail as a basis for intelligent systems as these scale up.
That some theoretical basis is required for intelligent systems to be successfully realized
is widely acknowledged. The system is expected to make determinations for circumstances
that may not be foreseen by the designer, and these determinations will need therefore to
be derived using some principled basis. In this pursuit the most widely advocated theo-
ries have been the equivalents of the predicate calculus [6], on the one hand, and Bayesian
reasoning [10], on the other, or some combination of these. These theories do have much to
offer, being mathematically consistent theories that attempt to address directly the represen-
tation of knowledge. Their main drawback from our perspective is that they do not address
directly the issue of robustness. Indeed, as a broad generalization, it has proved in practice
that systems based on these theories are brittle, in the sense that, as the knowledge bases in
such systems grow, the predictions made by them degrade significantly. This phenomenon
is not difficult to explain. These theories guarantee accuracy of predictions only if the model
created in terms of them is consistent and accurate. Such guarantees of accuracy and con-
sistency are not available in areas, such as commonsense knowledge, which we define here
to be just those for which no exact axiomatization is known.
We regard the Bayesian framework as an elaboration of the classical logical one. It is ap-
propriate in cases where the knowledge being axiomatized contains probabilistic processes,
and there is some hope of an axiomatization. Since it is just an elaboration of logic, and in
that sense at least as difficult to apply to model complex knowledge, we do not regard it
as helpful in cases where even the deterministic aspects of the knowledge being modeled
is so ill understood that there has been no success in modeling even that part. Putting it
another way, the Bayesian framework would be a panacea if the only obstacle to model-
ing commonsense knowledge wete that it was some probabilistic version of something that
could be successfully modeled otherwise. However, we believe that the obstacles are of
a different and more severe nature: The basic concepts in this knowledge, as represented
typically by natural language words, do not generally have unambiguous meanings. They
may number tens or hundreds of thousands, as they do in the experiments reported in [8].
Typically, an observed situation contains much incomplete information - the truth value of
most concepts in any one situation is unstated and unknown. Finally, there is no reason
to believe that an accurate model of the totality of the possible relationships among these
multitudinous concepts exists.
While the predicate calculus and Bayesian reasoning may be useful intellectual aids
in designing systems, by themselves they do not offer the guarantee of robustness that is
needed: significant aspects of the world are difficult enough to describe accurately, and
when conclusions are to be drawn from conjoining a series of these aspects then the errors
are likely to grow out of control.
Our proposal is that the only guarantee of robustness that is viable for complex ma-
nipulations on uncertain unaxiomatized pieces of knowledge is that offered by learning
processes that have access to instances of the world to which the knowledge refers. The
knowledge in the system can then be constantly tested and updated against real world ex-
amples. The behavior of the system will then be guaranteed in a statistical sense to be cor-
rect with high probability on examples drawn from the same probability distribution from
which the learning experience was drawn. Thus the semantics we advocate for systems that
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manipulate commonsense knowledge is PAC semantics [12], which we shall discuss below.
We shall require not just the learning aspects but also the outcomes of the reasoning processes to
be predictably accurate in that sense. An argument for why an a priori guarantee of accuracy,
as guaranteed by PAC semantics, is needed for all aspects of the system can be illustrated
by distinguishing three situations:
In a first kind of situation, which we call (A), we have a candidate intelligent system
at hand. To test whether its behavior is effective we can run it on live examples. We will
for sure get a reliable statistical assessment of the system’s accuracy on the distribution of
examples on which it is tested.
In another situation, which we shall label (C), we do not have a candidate system at
hand, but are asking whether one can be built at all, and wondering on what principles it
might be built so as to be able to pass a live test as described above. The PAC-model of
learning is designed exactly for this situation. It promises that a system, based on certain al-
gorithms and trained on enough examples of a fixed but arbitrary function that is within the
capabilities of the learning algorithm, will with high probability be able to pass the live test
described in situation (A). The PAC model guarantees that the processes are computationally
feasible, needing only a polynomial amount of computation and data. Equally importantly,
the model acknowledges the possibility that errors will be made in the predictions, but these
errors will be controlled in the sense that they can be made arbitrarily small by increasing, in a
polynomially bounded manner, the amount of data and computation that is being invested.
The PAC model, which captures and quantifies both the computational and statistical as-
pects of learning, is designed to capture exactly the desiderata of any system that draws its
knowledge from, and needs to perform well in, a world that is too complex to be modeled
exactly.
It is conceivable, of course, that systems based on principles, such as Bayesian infer-
ence or the predicate calculus, that do not guarantee robustness a priori in this way will by
chance offer such robustness. This has not happened to date. We would argue that if such
robustness is found then that too will be a phenomenon of PAC semantics, and therefore
most fruitfully described in those terms. Whatever thought aids may have been used in the
design, the only sense in which the result can be declared a success is in the PAC sense that
the system is accurate in its ultimate task on natural examples, and requires only efficiently
computable processes.
Returning to our enumeration of the different situations, we note that there is also an
intermediate situation (B). There we have a candidate system at hand, as in (A), but instead
of testing it against live data we are given a set of examples on which the system has per-
formed well, with the promise that the examples were once chosen live from a distribution,
but no promise that the system was designed independently of these examples. We can vali-
date the system against the examples, as in (A), but we have reason to be suspicious that the
system was tailor made to fit the data. However, ignoring the computational aspects of the
PAC model and retaining only the statistical ones, we can obtain confidence in the system
if the system is simple enough in terms of the amount of corroborating data, whether this
simplicity is measured in terms of the number of bits [1] or the VC-dimension [2] of the sys-
tem description. This situation (B) is also interesting because it, like situation (A), provides
a principled reason for having confidence in a system even if the design methodology of the
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system did not guarantee such confidence.
We conclude that what we need ideally is a design methodology that guarantees ro-
bustness in the PAC sense, as in situation (C). We may be lucky and derive systems with
similar performance in the PAC sense, as verified in situations (A) or (B), without having
used a methodology that is guided by a PAC guarantee. However, based on the past history
of such attempts, we estimate the likelihood of this succeeding as being small.
We are not suggesting that heuristics, or algorithms whose success is not well under-
stood, be avoided altogether. In robust logic we first learn rules that are accurate in the
PAC sense, and then we chain these together in a way that gives predictions that are also
accurate in the PAC sense if the learned rules were. It may be valid to use heuristics in each
of the two halves if sight is not lost of the overall goal that the final predictions have to be
accurate in the PAC sense. For example, the first half is a standard machine learning task.
There is ample evidence for the existence of algorithms, such as various decision tree algo-
rithms, that appear to be effective PAC learning algorithms for some useful set of functions
and distributions that have yet to be characterized. There is no reason for not using these
if these are shown to be effective in practice. What we are saying, however, is that if we do
not plan for PAC accuracy at every stage, in the manner of robust logic, for example, then
we are unlikely to get PAC accuracy in the final predictions.
3 Teaching Materials
The problem of creating systems that realize KI has two parts. The first is the design of
the specific learning and reasoning algorithms that are to be used, as discussed for example
in [14]. The second is the manner in which the real world knowledge is presented to the
system. It may be possible to arrive at reasonable proposals for the former algorithmic
questions once and for all. However, the second aspect, which we call the preparation of
teaching materials, may be an endless task reflective of the endless effort humans put into the
analogous process in the education of the young.
While we emphasize that the main characteristic of commonsense knowledge is that no
axiomatization is known, we welcome the use of any attempted axiomatizations of parts of
the knowledge. For example, when processing natural language texts dictionaries of syn-
onyms and antonyms, as provided, for example, by WordNet [9], are extremely useful, and
are used, in fact, in the experiments reported in [8]. Similarly, hand-designed ontologies
of knowledge, as developed for example in [5], may have an important role in providing
information that is difficult to acquire elsewhere. We shall regard such hand-designed at-
tempted axiomatizations also as teaching materials. When these are used in a KI system
they should be regarded as having PAC semantics also, and subject to modification in the
light of experience. For example, if a dictionary contains some inconsistencies then this will
be discovered in the course of applying this knowledge to examples. Of course, equally
welcome as teaching materials to hand-crafted methods, are automatic methods of obtain-
ing reliable knowledge, even when these are of restricted forms (e.g. [3]).
The teaching materials can be expected to have some hand-designed architecture. For
example, the knowledge may be layered, so that the most fundamental knowledge is in-
fused first, and subsequent layers that depend on that first layer are infused later. Of course,
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the creation of teaching materials for even one layer may be expected to be challenging.
Naturally occurring sources, such as books or the web, may omit essential knowledge that
humans acquire by other means. We hope that progress in building useful systems will
be made, nevertheless, once the problem of constructing teaching materials is raised to the
status of a first-class intellectual activity.
A fundamental difficulty may arise in bootstrapping this process. For example, if the
lowest layer of concepts on which the multi-layered learning is performed consists of visual
primitives, which are at least partially available at birth in biological systems, or of knowl-
edge of three dimensional space at a level not explicitly taught to children, then there re-
mains the problem of providing these primitives to the system. It is conceivable that this can
be done by programming. However, there remains the possibility that, just as with higher
level concepts, the only practical way of putting these into a machine in a robust enough
manner is by learning. Now evolution can also be regarded as a learning process, and re-
cently a theory of evolvability has been formulated in the PAC framework [16]. Hence one
can envisage constructing teaching materials for intelligent systems to correspond not only
to knowledge learned by individual humans, but also to knowledge acquired by them from
their ancestors through evolution. We believe that biology provides an existence proof that
cognitive systems based on pure learning and appropriate teaching materials are feasible.
It remains, however, a significant research endeavor to find pragmatic ways of constructing
useful systems by means of these methods, with or without programmed components.
4 Further Issues
What we have attempted to argue here is that there is no hope of creating intelligent systems
if one fails to incorporate mechanisms, in the manner of KI, that guarantee robustness of the
decisions made by the system. Over the decades researchers have identified many other
difficulties in the pursuit of intelligent systems. The question arises as to whether KI makes
some of these difficulties even less tractable, or contributes to alleviating these.
The first general point we make is that, at least from a cognitive perspective, the PAC
semantics of KI should be viewed as substantially assumption-free and not as imposing
substantive constraints. The definition does presuppose that the function being learned is
within the capabilities of the learning algorithm. However, as long as we are learning con-
cepts that are learnable at all, for example by a biological system, then we have an existence
proof that such a learning algorithm exists. We note that an actual system will attempt to
learn many concepts simultaneously. It will succeed for those for which it has enough data,
and that are simple enough when expressed in terms of the previously reliably learned con-
cepts that they lie in the learnable class. The system can recognize which concepts it has
learned reliably and which not, and will only use the former for reasoning. In this way a
system will have a principled way of discovering which fragments of the knowledge offer
useful predictive power, without having to embark on the hopeless task of modeling all of
it.
Second, we argue that the statistical notion of correctness against a real world distribu-
tion of examples in the PAC sense is the best we can hope for. Of course, in many areas of
science, particularly physics, strong predictive models of the world whether deterministic
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or probabilistic do hold. This is because these models are based on an axiomatization of
a restricted aspect of the world. Clearly, for any aspect of the world that can be similarly
axiomatized (i.e. for which an accurate generative model can be designed) whether in terms
of differential equations, mathematical logic, or explicit probabilistic models, such models
can lead to predictions that work in all cases with quantifiable error and are superior. How-
ever, commonsense reasoning addresses areas where such axiomatizations and generative
models have met with limited success. In particular systems based on them have not scaled.
The considerable success of machine learning as compared with programmed systems, in
speech recognition, computer vision and natural language processing, we interpret as de-
riving from the fact that the robustness that learning offers outweighs the possible benefits
of partially correct axiomatizations. For the general commonsense reasoning problem we
expect this tradeoff to tilt considerably further towards machine learning.
Finally, we ask whether PAC semantics offers solutions to the difficulties that have been
identified for other approaches? This issue has been discussed in [13]. There it is argued
that such issues as conflict resolution, context, incomplete information, and nonmonotonic
phenomena, which are problematic to various degrees for classical logic, are not inherently
problematic in PAC semantics. In fact, interesting new possibilities arise, for example, in the
treatment of incomplete information [7].
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